Abstract:Reinforcement learning (RL) systems typically optimize scalar reward functions that assume precise and reliable evaluation of outcomes. However, real-world objectives--especially those derived from human preferences--are often uncertain, context-dependent, and internally inconsistent. This mismatch can lead to alignment failures such as reward hacking, over-optimization, and overconfident behavior.
We introduce a dual-source uncertainty-aware reward framework that explicitly models both epistemic uncertainty in value estimation and uncertainty in human preferences. Model uncertainty is captured via ensemble disagreement over value predictions, while preference uncertainty is derived from variability in reward annotations. We combine these signals through a confidence-adjusted Reliability Filter that adaptively modulates action selection, encouraging a balance between exploitation and caution.
Empirical results across multiple discrete grid configurations (6x6, 8x8, 10x10) and high-dimensional continuous control environments (Hopper-v4, Walker2d-v4) demonstrate that our approach yields more stable training dynamics and reduces exploitative behaviors under reward ambiguity, achieving a 93.7% reduction in reward-hacking behavior as measured by trap visitation frequency. We demonstrate statistical significance of these improvements and robustness under up to 30% supervisory noise, albeit with a trade-off in peak observed reward compared to unconstrained baselines.
By treating uncertainty as a first-class component of the reward signal, this work offers a principled approach toward more reliable and aligned reinforcement learning systems.
| Comments: | 31 pages, 18 figures, 3 tables |
| Subjects: | Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) |
| ACM classes: | I.2.6; I.2.0 |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2604.26360 [cs.LG] |
| (or arXiv:2604.26360v1 [cs.LG] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.26360 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Disha Singha [view email]
[v1]
Wed, 29 Apr 2026 07:14:01 UTC (2,380 KB)
