Abstract:Deploying LLMs in multi-turn dialogues facilitates jailbreak attacks that distribute harmful intent across seemingly benign turns. Recent training-based multi-turn jailbreak methods learn long-horizon attack strategies from interaction feedback, but often rely on coarse trajectory-level outcome signals that broadcast uniformly to every turn. However, we find that turn-level contributions in multi-turn jailbreaking are non-uniform, phase-dependent, and target-specific. Such coarse outcome supervision induces a credit assignment problem, leading to over-rewarding redundant turns in successful trajectories and under-crediting useful intermediate turns in failed ones. To address this, we propose TRACE, a turn-aware credit assignment framework for reinforcement learning (RL)-based multi-turn jailbreaking. For successful trajectories, TRACE estimates turn-level contributions via leave-one-turn-out semantic masking; for failed ones, TRACE assigns penalties based on prompt harmfulness and semantic relevance, with an additional local refusal-aware penalty. Furthermore, we reuse the attack-side credit signal for multi-turn defense alignment. Extensive experiments on open-source and closed-source targets show that TRACE achieves strong overall performance in effectiveness, transferability, and efficiency, yielding about a 25% relative improvement in attack success rate over the strongest RL baseline while also improving the safety-utility balance when reused for defense alignment.
| Comments: | 41 pages, 10 figures |
| Subjects: | Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2605.08778 [cs.AI] |
| (or arXiv:2605.08778v1 [cs.AI] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.08778 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Zhida He [view email]
[v1]
Sat, 9 May 2026 08:07:30 UTC (1,093 KB)
