Abstract:We present swarm-attack, an open-source adversarial testing framework in which multiple lightweight LLM agents coordinate through shared memory, parallel exploration, and evolutionary optimization. Together, our results demonstrate that both safety bypass of frontier models and software vulnerability discovery, i.e., the capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview, are achievable at effectively zero cost using commodity hardware and openly available models. We report two experiments. In the first, five instances of a 1.2 billion parameter model conducted 225 jailbreak attacks each against GPT-4o and Claude Sonnet~4. Against GPT-4o, the swarm achieved an Effective Harm Rate of 45.8%, producing 49 critical-severity breaches; against Claude Sonnet-4, the Effective Harm Rate was 0% despite a 40% technical success rate. In the second experiment, the same models performed combined source code analysis and binary fuzzing against a vulnerable C application with 9 planted CWEs. With a hand-crafted exploit seed corpus, regex pattern detection, and AddressSanitizer-based crash classification, the pipeline recovers 9 of 9 vulnerabilities (100% recall) in approximately four minutes on a consumer MacBook. With those scaffold components disabled, the same model recovers 0 of 9 by crash verification and 2 of 9 by citation. The capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview is therefore reproducible at effectively zero cost; the important enabler is the system scaffold itself, which compensates for the limited reasoning capacity of small individual models.
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2605.09504 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2605.09504v1 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.09504 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Michael A. Riegler [view email]
[v1]
Sun, 10 May 2026 12:27:14 UTC (26 KB)