Abstract:Extensive research has highlighted the severe threats posed by backdoor attacks to deep reinforcement learning (DRL). However, prior studies primarily focus on vanilla scenarios, while plasticity interventions have emerged as indispensable built-in components of modern DRL agents. Despite their effectiveness in mitigating plasticity loss, the impact of these interventions on DRL backdoor vulnerabilities remains underexplored, and this lack of systematic investigation poses risks in practical DRL deployments. To bridge this gap, we empirically study 14,664 cases integrating representative interventions and attack scenarios. We find that only one intervention (i.e., SAM) exacerbates backdoor threats, while other interventions mitigate them. Pathological analysis identifies that the exacerbation is attributed to backdoor gradient amplification, while the mitigation stems from activation pathway disruption and representation space compression. From these findings, we derive two novel insights: (1) a conceptual framework SCC for robust backdoor injection that deconstructs the mechanistic interplay between interventions and backdoors in DRL, and (2) abnormal loss landscape sharpness as a key indicator for DRL backdoor detection.
| Comments: | To appear in the Forty-Third International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2026), July 6-11, 2026, Seoul, South Korea |
| Subjects: | Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2605.14587 [cs.LG] |
| (or arXiv:2605.14587v1 [cs.LG] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14587 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Oubo Ma [view email]
[v1]
Thu, 14 May 2026 08:58:24 UTC (4,682 KB)