Authors:Chengzhi Liu, Yichen Guo, Yepeng Liu, Yuzhe Yang, Qianqi Yan, Xuandong Zhao, Wenyue Hua, Sheng Liu, Sharon Li, Yuheng Bu, Xin Eric Wang
Abstract:LLM agents increasingly run inside execution harnesses that dispatch tools, allocate resources, and route messages between specialized components. However, a harness can return a correct, benign answer over a trajectory that accesses unauthorized resources or leaks context to the wrong agent. Output-level evaluation cannot see these failures, yet most safety benchmarks score only final outputs or terminal states, even though many violations occur mid-trajectory rather than at termination. The central question is whether the harness respects user intent, permission boundaries, and information-flow constraints throughout execution. To address this gap, we propose HarnessAudit, a framework that audits full execution trajectories across boundary compliance, execution fidelity, and system stability, with a focus on multi-agent harnesses where these risks are most pronounced. We further introduce HarnessAudit-Bench, a benchmark of 210 tasks across eight real-world domains, instantiated in both single-agent and multi-agent configurations with embedded safety constraints. Evaluating ten harness configurations across frontier models and three multi-agent frameworks, we find that: (i) task completion is misaligned with safe execution, and violations accumulate with trajectory length; (ii) safety risks vary across domains, task types, and agent roles; (iii) most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer; and (iv) multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface, while harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment.
| Comments: | 11 Pages, 8 Figures |
| Subjects: | Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computers and Society (cs.CY) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2605.14271 [cs.CL] |
| (or arXiv:2605.14271v1 [cs.CL] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14271 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Chengzhi Liu [view email]
[v1]
Thu, 14 May 2026 02:14:28 UTC (11,063 KB)
